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(New York: Peter Lang, 1999). £33. ISBN 0 8204 3677 1. 
These two books, when read together, make an exceedingly interesting comparative study of 
'sympathy', that term so pervasive in George Eliot's work. Audrey Jaffe's book resituates the 
idea of 'sympathy' in the Foucauldian notions of spectacularization and surveillance, thus 
examining sympathy from a cultural studies perspective. She comments that her book is 'not 
an attempt to define sympathy per se ... this book rather exposes and explores the recurrent 
connection between sympathy, representation, and constructions of social identity in a series 
of Victorian texts' (8). Jaffe thus brings an entirely new perspective to bear on what critics and 
readers - and probably Eliot herself - have understood as 'sympathy'. Ellen Argyros works 
with the traditional idea of sympathy as a humanist ideal, researching the parameters of Eliot's 
focus in Words worth, Rousseau, Feuerbach, and Stowe. Her book is largely a close reading of 
sympathy in Eliot's novels and essays. Nevertheless, Argyros also produces a new perspective 
on Eliot's representation of 'sympathy' by looking at its limits, rather than its magnitude, in 
her work. The two books together, then, accomplish a very Eliotian project: they enlarge our 
understanding of sympathy - and this is the more admirable in that sympathy would seem to 
be at least an overworked, if not an exhausted, critical term by this time. 
Beginning with a provocative pairing of passages from Kaja Silverman's The Threshold of the 
Visual World (1995) and Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/1790), Jaffe 
elaborates her theory that 'sympathy' and 'spectacle' are typically linked in Victorian fiction. 
'The Victorian subject, as numerous studies have pointed out, was figured crucially and with 
increasing emphasis as a spectator ... Society becomes a field of visual cues and its members 
alternative selves: imaginary possibilities in a field of circulating social images, confounded 
and interdependent projections of identity' (3). Sympathy is not a direct response to a sufferer 
but rather, as Adam Smith recognized, 'to a sufferer's representation in a spectator's mind' (4). 
Therefore, 'the scene of sympathy in effect effaces both its participants, substituting for them 
images, or fantasies, of social and cultural identity' (4). The spectator may thus experience 
'specular panic', choosing to look away from, rather than at, this object whose representation 
may generate a narrative of 'the anxiety of bodily contagion, the fear of inhabiting the beg-
gar's place' (5). Silverman's work demonstrates how such a scene may resemble a 'negative 
version of the Althusserian scenario of interpellation', for it is the spectator's refusal to be 
'hailed', to recognize the other and in the process the self, that here constitutes subjectivity. 
The difference between looking and not looking is collapsed, for the very act of looking at the 
'object' displaces that object into representation. There is a 'tendency to ward off actual bodies 
in the sympathetic encounter, replacing them with cultural fictions and self-projections ... ' (7). 
Victorian representations of sympathy thus capture a 'tension' between sympathy as humani-
tarian value and sympathy as uneasy identification (19). 
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With this fresh theorization of 'sympathy', Jaffe opens up the Victorian fictions she reads to 
new understandings of the social construction of identities. Appropriately choosing Dickens's 
'A Christmas Carol' - which is, after all, about how to make an unsympathetic character sym-
pathetic - Jaffe shows how the narrative spectacularizes both commodity culture and literature 
for Scrooge, positioning him as reader and interpreter of cultural scenes, and demonstrating 
his need to regain 'a gift giving defined as the purchase and exchange of commodities' (43). 
In this fascinating chapter - first published in PMLA (1994) - Jaffe introduces a prominent 
aspect of her analysis: sympathy follows the logic of a 'capitalist sensibility' (45). Jaffe does 
equally compelling and instructive readings of the production of sympathy as social and cul-
tural identity in works by Arthur Conan Doyle, Elizabeth Gaskell, Ellen Wood, and Oscar 
Wilde, but it is her reading of Daniel Deronda that concerns us here. 
Introducing her reading with an unusual critical choice of scenes of spectacularization in the 
novel (most of us can't seem to get past that first one, when Daniel pinions Gwendolen as the 
object of his gaze), Jaffe opens with Mordecai's museum promenade, where he searches for an 
image of the man who will fulfill his ideal. While Mordecai is unmistakably a Jew in appear-
ance, Jaffe notes that 'the most important feature of Jewishness as an aspect of Deronda's cul-
tural and physical identity is its invisibility' (128). Like Dorothea Brooke, he is drawn from 
Eliot's 'portfolio of classically featured sympathizers' because, paradoxically, 'in order to 
identify himself with and as Western culture's most "marked" other, he must be unmarked 
himself' (129). By thus making Deronda unJewish in appearance, Jaffe perceptively com-
ments, Eliot situates him 'on both sides of a colonialist imaginary.' The narrative 'participates 
in a Lawrence-of-Arabia-like mode of cultural cross-dressing that is an expression of colonial 
power: an exemption from the identity boundaries that constrain others' (129). 
Although, as Jaffe points out, 'Eliot devoted her artistic career to the expansion of her readers' 
consciousness through sympathy', something different happens in her last novel: Deronda's 
task is to identify with his own hereditary people, i.e. to seek out sameness (130, 131). The 
novel replaces one brand of sympathy with another, directing its protagonist to forego univer-
sal sympathy in favor of 'a narrative of nationhood' that narrows and focuses his concerns 
(132). Hence, Jaffe argues that the issue of his circumcision, and Cynthia Chase's contention 
in her 1978 PMLA article, 'The Decomposition of the Elephants: Double-Reading Daniel 
Deronda,' that this physical fact disrupts linear causality and deconstructs narrative realism, is 
unimportant. The Jewish body is simply 'left aside' in the narrative because what is important 
is not Deronda's discovery of his Jewishness but his 'consent to the fact' (134). Jaffe critiques 
what she sees as 'literal-mindedness' and 'essentialism' underlying Chase's deconstructive 
argument, proposing instead that 'Eliot conceives of a subject who, though born a Jew, must 
come to desire Jewish identity through the gradual assumption of a feeling of likeness and 
belonging. And, when this feeling arrives, this subject discovers - in a circular fantasy of com-
plete sympathy in which the physical body gives empirical weight to the feeling of belong-
ing-that he is that other. Deronda's body is sympathy made manifest .. .' (138). In Jaffe's 
words, his body is 'the novel's most phantasmatic construction' (139). 
Jaffe's study points out that Deronda's initial 'many-sided sympathy ... hinder[sl any persis-
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tent course of action' (131). It must be narrowed down if it is to become active. In the end, 
sympathy in Daniel Deronda means 'knowing whom to sympathize with' (157). Argyros's 
study, though it takes off from the much more traditional notion of sympathy as an 'ethical cat-
egory,' also focuses on the limitations, contradictions, or downright failures of sympathy in 
Eliot's work. Beginning with a definition of what she believes to be Eliot's 'most profound 
sense of the term', Argyros defines it as 'a kind of imaginative transportation beyond the 
boundaries of the self and its most egoistic claims to a recognition of the differences between 
self and other, ending finally with an identification between self and other that leads one to 
take action on behalf of that other' (1-2). But 'paradoxically, sympathy is what both enables 
one to have imaginative access into another's situation and is the result of one's imaginative 
consideration of another's situation, so that it is difficult to develop it if one does not already 
possess it ... ' (2). 
In addition to this inherent paradox, Argyros considers what happens to 'sympathy' if its rep-
resentation in different genres of Eliot's work is compared. She asks why it is, for example, 
that Eliot can promote sympathy with a hypocritical Evangelical clergyman who is also a mur-
derer in one of her novels, while raking an actual Evangelical clergyman - hypocritical to be 
sure, but not murderous - over the coals in a review essay that offers no sympathy whatever. 
At first, one wants to make the obvious rejoinder that a review essay and a novel are such dif-
ferent genres that of course one would expect to see very different approaches to the question 
of judgement versus sympathy. Certainly it's understandable that a reviewer would want to 
expose the hypocrisy of a hugely popular Evangelical preacher like John Cumming who was 
so intensely anti-Catholic that he was essentially condemning the majority of the London 
working-class population, not to mention Anglo-Catholics and European Catholics, to ever-
lasting fires. But Bulstrode? A fallen man, toppled from his pride of place, crushed and pitiful, 
supported by his loyal and compassionate wife - shouldn't we be sympathetic with him? Well, 
should we? Once you put the essay and the novel together as comparative examples of Eliot's 
sympathy or lack of it, as Argyros does, you cannot help seeing Bulstrode, and his creator, with 
new eyes. Why indeed does Eliot think it is a valid project to make her readers feel sympathy 
for a Bulstrode and revulsion for a Cumming? 
In later chapters of her book, Argyros compares and contrasts other enactments of sympathy 
that expose its limitations in Eliot's work. For example, she compares Maggie Tulliver and 
Latimer as 'sympathizers', and explores the construction of Bertha in The Lifted Veil as a char-
acter for whom it is impossible to feel sympathy. Similarly, Argyros compares the confession 
scenes between two women who are 'rivals' for the same man - Dinah and Hetty, Dorothea 
and Rosamond - with the lack of any such confessional sympathy between Gwendolen and 
Mirah. In effect, Argyros interrogates Eliot's cultural text at the points of its greatest vulnera-
bility. Although her analysis is somewhat repetitious and seems overly confined to her own 
close readings, she nevertheless raises intriguing questions about the functioning of 'sympa-
thy' in Eliot's work. 
Interestingly, in her reading of Daniel Deronda, Argyros considers a notion of sympathy that 
seems nearly identical to Jaffe's, suggesting that ' ... Eliot's "sympathy" has a theatrical com-
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ponent to it, as Eliot is forced to acknowledge the epistemological problem presented in the 
difficulty of knowing another's thoughts except through a reading of that person as spectacle, 
text' (222). Both writers cite David Marshall's The Surprising Effects of Sympathy: Marivaux, 
Diderot, Rousseau, and Mary Shelley (1988) for this understanding of sympathy as 'theatri-
cal'. But for Argyros this approach to the question of sympathy is almost an after-thought: the 
chief thrust of her project is to investigate the ethics of Eliot's 'ethical category' as deployed 
in a broad selection of her writings. Like Jaffe, she finds Daniel Deronda one of Eliot's most 
flagrant failures as a sympathetic character. In Daniel's response to his mother, 'his tone is 
stiff, formal, forced ... His final response to her story "Was my grandfather a learned man?" 
is a chillingly inappropriate one at best, a thinly-veiled hostile one at worst. In that one ques-
tion Eliot packs the entirety of Daniel Deronda's most unempathetic nature' (215). Jaffe com-
ments that 'in interview after interview with Gwendolen and his mother, he appears awkward, 
stiff, and unable to speak - unable, despite his own and Eliot's protestations to the contrary, to 
sympathize' (143). Both critics reach a basically unsympathetic judgement on the character 
whom Eliot probably regarded as her most sympathetic. How ironic that the work Eliot hoped 
would be her most radical and politically effective staging of sympathy should serve late-twen-
tieth-century critics as exemplar of its inevitable limitations and conservatism. 
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